The Symfony Validator component IpValidator incompletely classifies internal addresses in the filtered modes of the Ip constraint, so some internal addresses are accepted as public, which can lead to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.
In these modes, IpValidator relies on the PHP flags FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE and FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE to classify addresses as public, private, or reserved. These flags do not cover shared address space (100.64.0.0/10) or IPv4-mapped, IPv4-compatible, and 6to4 IPv6 addresses, which can embed internal IPv4 addresses. A value such as ::ffff:127.0.0.1 can therefore pass validation even though it points to an internal host.
Applications that rely on the Ip constraint to reject internal addresses, for example before making a server-side request to a user-supplied address, can be exposed to SSRF.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (6.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 6.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.CISA-ADP (Vulnrichment) CVSS v3.1 · CVSS v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-10). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it