CVE-2023-25690
CRITICALNVD 9.8EG9.8—EchelonGraph scoreMEDIUM confidence
“—” beside the score: it is equal to NVD's CVSS score.
Score 9.8 from GitHub Security Advisory (severity: CRITICAL) published 2023-03-07. NVD baseline CVSS 9.8; sources differ by 0.0.
Triggered by: GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
Sources: EPSS, GitHub Security Advisory, NVD CVSS v3
Also known asEUVD-2023-29605 (ENISA EUVD) · GHSA-wc6r-9c75-44gq (GitHub Security Advisories)Source: ENISA EUVD
EchelonGraph verdictPlan a fixRemediate within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •293 internet-facing services (distinct ip:port) on record running an affected version — derived from Shodan data (© Shodan); a patched service can stay counted while its port stays open
- •High exploitation likelihood — EPSS 84%
- •Public exploit or proof-of-concept code is available
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 84%CVSS: 9.8Exploit: Public PoCExposed services: 293
A fix is available — apply it.
Some mod_proxy configurations on Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.0 through 2.4.55 allow a HTTP Request Smuggling attack.
Configurations are affected when mod_proxy is enabled along with some form of RewriteRule
or ProxyPassMatch in which a non-specific pattern matches
some portion of the user-supplied request-target (URL) data and is then
re-inserted into the proxied request-target using variable
substitution. For example, something like:
RewriteEngine on
RewriteRule "^/here/(.*)" "http://example.com:8080/elsewhere?$1"; [P]
ProxyPassReverse /here/ http://example.com:8080/
Request splitting/smuggling could result in bypass of access controls in the proxy server, proxying unintended URLs to existing origin servers, and cache poisoning. Users are recommended to update to at least version 2.4.56 of Apache HTTP Server.
Internet exposure · derived from Shodan data
293 internet-facing services (distinct ip:port) on record running a version that maps to CVE-2023-25690, in our KEV-Exposure radar’s Shodan-derived sample.
across 49 hosting countries (United States, Germany, Japan, France, India)top: http_server
See the KEV-Exposure radar →Derived from Shodan data. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan). EchelonGraph claims no ownership of it or copyright in it. Aggregate, host-redacted. How it counts: every 12 hours, when Shodan query credits allow, the radar runs one Shodan query per tracked product, reads up to 100 ip:port services per query, and keeps a service when its banner version matches a CISA-KEV or high-EPSS CVE; a service is dropped when neither a search nor a Shodan InternetDB port re-check has refreshed it for 21 days. A re-check that finds the port still listed by Shodan InternetDB refreshes the service without re-reading the banner, so a patched service can stay counted while its port stays open. A count is a banner-version inference over a sample, not an exploit test and not an internet-wide census, and the unit is a service, not a machine: a machine answering on two ports counts twice.
- CVSS v3
- 9.8
- EG Score
- 9.8CRITICALmedium confidence
- EG Riskⓘ
- 93
EG Risk 93/100
EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.
How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)
Severity98% × 45%
Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 9.8 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.
Exploitation84% × 40%
FIRST EPSS: the 30-day exploitation probability when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.
Automatability100% × 15%
CISA's SSVC Automatable value: yes (Vulnrichment).
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at low, Track* at medium and Attend at high mission impact.
Exploitation public PoC (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.
Action: A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
- EPSS PROB
- 84%
- EPSS %ILE
- 99th
- KEV
- Not listed
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.8 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 84% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-12). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track* at medium mission impactTrack at low, Track* at medium and Attend at high mission impact.CISA BOD 26-04: 3 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low, Track* at medium and Attend at high mission impact.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation public PoC (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)3 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it
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