RHSA-2026:95652CriticalCVSS 9.9

Red Hat Security Advisory: Satellite 6.19 security update

Published
November 5, 2026
Last Modified
November 9, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (7)

📋 Description

CVE-2026-89078 — ruby: double free issue in regular expression parser CVE-2026-93577 — ruby: integer overflow issue in regular expression compiler CVE-2026-97229 — ruby: integer overflow issue in CI/CD regular expression compiler CVE-2026-104895 — com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat/jackson-dataformat-smile: jackson-dataformat-smile: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in asynchronous parser CVE-2026-110264 — ruby: integer overflow issue in regular expression compiler CVE-2026-115731 — puppetserver: openvox-agent: openvox-server: puppetserver: authenticated remote code execution via report event deserialization CVE-2026-115732 — trapperkeeper-authorization: puppetserver: openvox-server: openvoxdb: trapperkeeper-authorization: certificate name authorization bypass via flawed hostname ACL match

🎯 Affected products5

  • Red Hat Satellite 6.19 for RHEL 9
  • openvox-agent-0:8.32.0-1.el9sat.src as a component of Red Hat Satellite 6.19 for RHEL 9
  • openvox-agent-0:8.32.0-1.el9sat.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Satellite 6.19 for RHEL 9
  • openvox-server-0:8.18.0-1.el9sat.noarch as a component of Red Hat Satellite 6.19 for RHEL 9
  • openvox-server-0:8.18.0-1.el9sat.src as a component of Red Hat Satellite 6.19 for RHEL 9

✅ Remediation

Before applying this update, make sure all previously released errata relevant to your system have been applied. For detailed instructions how to apply this update, refer to: https://docs.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_satellite/6.19/html/updating_red_hat_satellite/index Workaround: To mitigate this vulnerability, do not compile regular expressions from untrusted sources. Standard safeguards such as Regexp.timeout or limiting the length of the input pattern do not protect against this issue. Workaround: Until patched, avoid autosigning certificate requests without strong verification so untrusted clients cannot obtain a CA-signed agent certificate. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-04) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to enforce safe deserialization allowlists for report event types in FromDataConverter to prevent dynamic class_eval execution: upgrade to openvox-server 9.2.0 and 8.18.0, Puppet Core agent 9.1.3 and 8.22.2 (or the fixed Openvox Server/Puppetserver builds), which restricts deserialization of report events to safe expected types to block untrusted __ptype instantiation and dynamic evaluation, closing crafted JSON report containing malicious serialized rich-data event types submitted via HTTP PUT. Until patched, this is a concern on Puppet Server and OpenVox Server instances processing agent reports, so avoid autosigning certificate requests without strong verification and restrict network access to the PUT /puppet/v3/report endpoint. As a compensating measure, enforce strict allowlist validation over report payload schemas and event structures before deserialization, deploy EDR to detect anomalous child processes and post-exploitation activity spawned by the puppetserver service user, configure auditd to log unauthorized system calls and command executions initiated by the puppetserver daemon, and use Falco or eBPF runtime security to detect unexpected shell invocations or sensitive credential reads by puppetserver. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying untrusted deserialization defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-1302 Deserialization Allowlist (Safe Loading) (high) Workaround: Until patched, avoid autosigning certificate requests without strong verification, and do not approve CSRs for names that are suffixes/prefixes of existing authorized certnames. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-04) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to enforce exact domain segment length matching and full domain equality for certificate hostname ACL checks in trapperkeeper-authorization: upgrade to openvox-server and openvoxdb 9.2.0, 8.18.0 (or the fixed Puppetserver/Openvox Server builds), which require domain segment counts to match for non-wildcard rules or validate full domain equality during ACL evaluation, closing all 2 injection vectors (subdomain certificate acquisition via autosigning, prefix or suffix certificate signing via CA approval). Until patched, this is a concern on Puppet Server, OpenVox Server, and OpenVoxDB deployments, so Avoid autosigning certificate requests without strict verification, reject CSR approvals for names that extend or shorten authorized certnames, and restrict network access to server endpoints. As a compensating measure, Deploy EDR agents to detect anomalous post-exploitation activity and unauthorized command execution on nodes targeted through catalog impersonation, Configure Falco or eBPF runtime security to detect anomalous process executions and unexpected shells spawned following catalog-driven execution, and Integrate application admin event logging with SIEM to detect unauthorized CA administrative operations or node catalog downloads with mismatched certnames. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying flawed hostname ACL matching defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-1001 EDR Agent (Endpoint Detection & Response) (medium)

🔗 References (3)