Microsoft security update for CVE-2026-66077 — azl3 rabbitmq-server
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Microsoft's advisory
EchelonGraph does not copy Microsoft's advisory page: its FAQ and remediation text are not shown here. Read the advisory on https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-66077. This page also shows what EchelonGraph holds for CVE-2026-66077, with the description from its CVE record, which the CVE Numbering Authority that assigned the CVE wrote: for a CVE Microsoft assigned, often in the words of Microsoft's own advisory.
🎯 Affected products3
- azl3 rabbitmq-server 3.13.7-10 on Azure Linux 3.0
- azl3 rabbitmq-server 3.13.7-11 on Azure Linux 3.0
- azl3 rabbitmq-server 3.13.7-9 on Azure Linux 3.0
✅ Updates Microsoft lists: 1 update
1 row: one per KB article or update, update type and fixed build. Their details are on Microsoft's advisory.
| KB article | Update | Fixed build |
|---|---|---|
| — | Security Update | — |
🧭 EchelonGraph on CVE-2026-66077
- EchelonGraph score
- 6.1 MEDIUM
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Fix status
- A fix is available — apply it.
Description from the CVE record (CVE.org), as published by its numbering authority
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, The management UI uses EJS 1.0 in which <%= ... %> does NOT HTML-escape. connection.ejs:135 renders <%= connection.ssl_details.peer_cert_subject %> (and peer_cert_issuer) directly into the page. The same pattern appears in streamConnection.ejs:102,106,110. The values come from rabbit_ssl:peer_cert_subject/1 which formats the DN as a string without HTML escaping. The verifier corrected the original researcher's claim: this is reachable only when the listener is configured with verify_peer (so the certificate must be signed by a CA in the broker's trust store, not arbitrary self-signed); however, in deployments using mTLS for client authentication, any user who can request a certificate from the organisational CA controls the Subject CN. An attacker who can obtain a TLS client certificate signed by a CA the broker trusts (with verify_peer enabled) can embed JavaScript in the certificate's Subject DN. When any administrator views that connection in the management UI, the script executes in the admin's browser session, allowing full account takeover (create users, export definitions, etc.). The management UI's CSP includes 'unsafe-inline', so inline script execution is not blocked. Preconditions include TLS listener configured with ssl_options.verify = verify_peer Attacker can obtain a CA-signed client certificate with attacker-chosen Subject (e.g. self-service corporate PKI, or rabbitmq_trust_store plugin in use) Administrator views the connection detail page. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.
Published by GitHub, Inc., the CVE Numbering Authority that assigned CVE-2026-66077, in its CVE record at CVE.org; reused under the CVE Program's Terms of Use (its licence and MITRE's copyright notice are in our Terms of Service).