WWBN AVideo's GIF poster fetch bypasses traversal scrubbing and exposes local files through public media URLs
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
Summary
objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin /videos/... URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path.
The vulnerable GIF branch could be abused to read local files such as /etc/passwd or application source files and republish those bytes through a normal public GIF media URL.
Details
The vulnerable chain was:
objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.phpaccepted attacker-controlleddownloadURL_gifimage- traversal scrubbing used
str_replace('../', '', ...), which was bypassable with overlapping input such as....// - same-origin
/videos/...URLs were accepted url_get_contents()andtry_get_contents_from_local()resolved the request into a local filesystem read- the fetched bytes were written into the GIF destination
- invalid GIF cleanup used the wrong variable, so the non-image payload remained on disk
This made the GIF poster path a local file disclosure primitive with public retrieval.
Proof of concept
- Log in as an uploader and create an owned video row through the normal encoder flow.
- Send:
POST /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php
downloadURL_gifimage=https://localhost/videos/....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd
- Query:
GET /objects/videos.json.php?showAll=1
- Recover the generated GIF URL from
videosURL.gif.url. - Download that GIF URL.
- Observe that the body matches the target local file, such as
/etc/passwd, byte-for-byte.
Impact
An authenticated uploader can read server-local files and republish them through a public GIF media URL by supplying a crafted same-origin /videos/... path to downloadURL_gifimage. Because traversal scrubbing was bypassable and the fetched bytes were written to the GIF destination without effective invalid-image cleanup, successful exploitation allows disclosure of files such as /etc/passwd, readable application source code, or deployment-specific configuration accessible to the application.
Recommended fix
- Reject any remote image URL whose decoded path contains traversal markers
- Do not allow attacker-controlled same-origin
/videos/...fetches to resolve into local file reads - Constrain any local shortcut path handling with
realpath()and strict base-directory allowlists - Validate GIF content before saving it into public media storage
- Ensure invalid-image cleanup checks the correct destination path
🎯 Affected products1
- composer/WWBN/AVideo:<= 26.0