AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 uses a cryptographically weak...

AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator when creating account activation / login pairing codes. getRandomCode() in objects/functions.php derives the code entirely from uniqid() (sprintf('%08x%05x', seconds, microseconds)) with a single non-CSPRNG rand() character used only as padding, reducing the code space to roughly 36 x 10^6 (~2^25) values for a known generation second. Because plugin/API/set.json.php?APIName=login_code can be called without authentication, it also serves as an oracle for the server's exact microtime. An unauthenticated remote attacker who guesses a valid, unexpired code (codes expire after 10 minutes) can redeem it at plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=login_code to obtain the target account's email address and a User::getUserHash(users_id, '+1 year') value, a credential accepted in place of the account password for one year, resulting in account takeover. No patched version is available.