XWiki Platform Attachment UI vulnerable to cross-site scripting in the move attachment form

Impact

It's possible to store JavaScript in an attachment name, which will be executed by anyone trying to move the corresponding attachment.

For example, an attachment with name ><img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>.jpg will execute the alert.

Patches

This issue has been patched in XWiki 14.4RC1.

Workarounds

It is possible to fix the vulnerability by copying moveStep1.vm to webapp/xwiki/templates/moveStep1.vm and replace

#set($titleToDisplay = $services.localization.render('attachment.move.title', 
  [$attachment.name, $escapetool.xml($doc.plainTitle), $doc.getURL()]))

by

#set($titleToDisplay = $services.localization.render('attachment.move.title', [
  $escapetool.xml($attachment.name), 
  $escapetool.xml($doc.plainTitle), 
  $escapetool.xml($doc.getURL())
]))

See the corresponding patch.

References

• https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-19667

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org
• Email us at Security Mailing List