Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to pin an unbounded number of HTTP/2 stream processes indefinitely via connection-level flow control. When a stream's response body outruns the HTTP/2 connection-level send window (default 65,535 bytes, shared across all streams on the connection), Bandit.HTTP2.Connection queues the remaining bytes and a reply closure in pending_sends and the stream process blocks forever inside a synchronous call to the connection process. Nothing bounds that wait and nothing purges the queue: a client RST_STREAM for the blocked stream is delivered to its mailbox but never read while it is stuck inside the call, so cancelling frees nothing, and periodic PING frames keep the transport-level read timeout from ever firing. The equivalent block on the stream-level send window is already bounded at 15 seconds; the connection-level path had no such bound.
Each stalled stream pins its process, Plug state, and any resource the Plug holds across the blocked write, such as a pooled upstream connection in a reverse-proxy Plug. The attacker chooses any endpoint whose response exceeds the connection window (common for most non-trivial payloads), grants a generous stream-level window so only the connection window limits it, and keeps the connection alive with periodic PINGs; the primitive is repeatable across streams and connections at the cost of one idle socket each.
This issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.12.5.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (8.7): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 8.7 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 8.7 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source
- EG Likelihood
- 0.6% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-12). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation public PoC (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it