In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: require net admin for TIPCv2 netlink mutators
TIPCv2 registers mutating generic-netlink operations without admin
permission flags. Generic netlink only checks CAP_NET_ADMIN when an
operation sets GENL_ADMIN_PERM or GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, so a local
unprivileged process can currently change TIPC state through commands
such as TIPC_NL_NET_SET, TIPC_NL_KEY_SET, TIPC_NL_KEY_FLUSH, and
bearer enable/disable.
The legacy TIPC netlink API already checks netlink_net_capable(...,
CAP_NET_ADMIN) for administrative commands. Give the TIPCv2 mutators
the equivalent generic-netlink gate. Use GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, which
maps to the same namespace-aware CAP_NET_ADMIN check that
netlink_net_capable() performs, so the behaviour matches the legacy
path and keeps working for CAP_NET_ADMIN holders in a non-initial user
namespace (containers).
A QEMU/KASAN repro run as uid/gid 65534 with zero effective
capabilities previously succeeded in changing the network id and node
identity, setting and flushing key material, and enabling/disabling a
UDP bearer. With this patch applied the same operations fail with
-EPERM.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-10). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it