Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ninenines cowboy allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust connection process memory over HTTP/1.1.
The HTTP/1.1 handler in cowboy_http enforces the max_headers limit by counting the number of distinct header names in a map (maps:size(Headers)). When a request contains multiple header lines with the same name, the values are concatenated into a single ever-growing binary stored under that one map key (", " for regular headers, "; " for cookies), so the map size stays at one and the max_headers cap (default 100) is never reached. Because no accumulator bounds the total number of header lines or the total byte size of the header block (only per-line max_header_name_length and max_header_value_length apply), an unauthenticated client can send an arbitrary number of header lines with the same name and grow the connection process's binary memory to arbitrary size within the request window.
The impact per connection is bounded by request_timeout (default 5 seconds, not reset by header data), and by max_heap_size when set (the offending connection process is killed once its heap grows past the limit). When max_heap_size is left at the default (unset), sustained abuse can drive the Erlang VM into out-of-memory conditions.
This issue affects cowboy from 2.0.0-pre.4 before 2.18.0.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (6.9): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 6.9 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 6.9 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source
- EG Likelihood
- 0.4% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-07). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it