EchelonGraph verdictPlan mitigationNo release containing the referenced fix is confirmed: check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.2%CVSS: 7.6Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
A fix is referenced (a reference tagged "Patch", often a source commit), but no release containing it is confirmed — find the release that contains it; until it is applied, mitigate (WAF / firewall / segmentation).
Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in Gleam allows an adversary in the middle to substitute forged Hex package contents during dependency resolution.
During dependency resolution Gleam fetches package metadata from the signature-verified Hex repository, which covers each release's dependency requirements and SHA-256 outer_checksum. After resolving versions, gleam_cli::dependencies::lookup_package makes a second request to the unsigned Hex API through gleam_core::hex::get_package_release and records the outer_checksum and dependency names from that JSON response into manifest.toml, instead of the values from the verified repository metadata. The Hex repository signature does not cover the API response.
An adversary in the middle who can intercept TLS with a certificate trusted by the Gleam process (for example a TLS-inspecting proxy using a CA in the operating system trust store or added through GLEAM_CACERTS_PATH), and who can modify both the API release response and the corresponding repository tarball, can supply a package archive with a matching forged checksum without the Hex repository signing key. Gleam verifies the forged tarball against the forged checksum, accepts it, and extracts it as a dependency source, resulting in loss of integrity of the downloaded package contents.
Only projects that resolve or update Hex dependencies are affected, which happens when the manifest is missing, a dependency is added or updated, or dependency requirements change. Builds that reuse an unchanged, known-good manifest.toml continue to verify tarballs against its pinned checksum.
This issue affects gleam: from 0.18.0-rc1 before 1.18.0.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.6): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.6 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.6 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is referenced, but no release containing it is confirmed. Check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it