In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()
remove_waiter() is used by the slowlock paths, but it is also used for
proxy-lock rollback in rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() when invoked from
futex_requeue().
In the latter case waiter::task is not current, but remove_waiter()
operates on current for the dequeue operation. That results in several
problems:
1) the rbtree dequeue happens without waiter::task::pi_lock being held
2) the waiter task's pi_blocked_on state is not cleared, which leaves a
dangling pointer primed for UAF around.
3) rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain() operates on the wrong top priority waiter
task
Use waiter::task instead of current in all related operations in
remove_waiter() to cure those problems.
[ tglx: Fixup rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain(), add a comment and amend the
changelog ]
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 5.4% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-09). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track* at medium mission impactTrack at low, Track* at medium and Attend at high mission impact.CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low, Track* at medium and Attend at high mission impact.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation public PoC (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it