Issue Summary: Cryptographic Message Services (CMS) processing fails to perform
sufficient input validation on the cipher and tag length fields of
AuthEnvelopedData containers, leading to various potential compromises.
Impact Summary: Attackers making use of these vulnerabilities may achieve
key-equivalent functionality for a given CMS recipient and/or bypass integrity
validation for a given message.
In one use case, an attacker may send a CMS message containing
AuthEnvelopedData with the cipher specified as a non-AEAD cipher. OpenSSL
erroneously allows this selection, and attempts to decrypt and validate the
message.
An on-path attacker who captures one legitimate AES-GCM AuthEnvelopedData
addressed to the victim can re-emit it with the recipientInfos set left
byte-for-byte intact, so the victim's private key still unwraps the genuine CEK
(the content-encryption key), but with the inner OID rewritten to AES-256-OFB
(Output Feedback Mode, an unauthenticated keystream mode) and with an
attacker-chosen IV and ciphertext. The victim initializes AES-256-OFB under the
real CEK, never consults the MAC field, and CMS_decrypt() returns success.
If the application under attack responds to the attacker with any indicator
showing success or failure of the decryption effort, it is possible for the
attacker to use this as an oracle to obtain key equivalent functionality for the
CEK used for the chosen recipient of the message.
In another use case, an attacker can reduce the tag length of the chosen AEAD
cipher for a given AuthEnvelopedData container to be a single byte long,
allowing an attacker to brute force CMS decryption, producing an integrity
bypass for applications that trust CMS_decrypt() to reject modified content.
The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.1 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 1.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-12). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it