In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: writeback: fix use-after-free in __mark_inode_dirty()
An use-after-free issue occurred when __mark_inode_dirty() get the
bdi_writeback that was in the progress of switching.
CPU: 1 PID: 562 Comm: systemd-random- Not tainted 6.6.56-gb4403bd46a8e #1
......
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418
lr : __mark_inode_dirty+0x118/0x418
sp : ffffffc08c9dbbc0
........
Call trace:
__mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418
generic_update_time+0x4c/0x60
file_modified+0xcc/0xd0
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x58/0x124
ext4_file_write_iter+0x54/0x704
vfs_write+0x1c0/0x308
ksys_write+0x74/0x10c
__arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x40/0xe4
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
Root cause is:
systemd-random-seed kworker
----------------------------------------------------------------------
___mark_inode_dirty inode_switch_wbs_work_fn
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
inode_attach_wb
locked_inode_to_wb_and_lock_list
get inode->i_wb
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
spin_lock(&wb->list_lock)
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock)
inode_io_list_move_locked
spin_unlock(&wb->list_lock)
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock)
spin_lock(&old_wb->list_lock)
inode_do_switch_wbs
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock)
inode->i_wb = new_wb
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock)
spin_unlock(&old_wb->list_lock)
wb_put_many(old_wb, nr_switched)
cgwb_release
old wb released
wb_wakeup_delayed() accesses wb,
then trigger the use-after-free
issue
Fix this race condition by holding inode spinlock until
wb_wakeup_delayed() finished.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-09). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it